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Abstract
Subsidizing small high-technology rms is now considered to be important in stimulating
economies throughout the world. This is because fast growing small rms create new markets
and jobs. The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program has played an important
role in the United States in subsidization providing two billion dollars every year. Japan
started its own SBIR program inspired by that in the United States.
This paper examined the direct eects of Japan's SBIR program by using attributes of
rms. First, we compared the overall changes in sales, employment, and the number of patents
between SBIR awardees and matching rms. However, SBIR awardees did not demonstrate
better performance in those changes. Therefore, it seems that the overall eect of Japan's
SBIR program has not produced positive results. Second, we examined regression models to
control other eects. As a result, we found SBIR awardees outperform matching rms when
they are in high technology industries and in areas with abundant venture capital investments.
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1 Introduction
Japan has suered from a serious long-term recession that began in 1991 and the Japanese gov-
ernment has tried, by various means, to solve the problem. One way has been to subsidize small,
high-technology rms, which are now considered to play important roles in stimulating economies
throughout the world (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2010). This is
because fast growing small rms have created new markets and jobs (Phillips & Kirchho, 1989).
There are two rationales to justify such subsidization. First, the social benets are greater than
the expenditure that rms spent on research and development (R&D) (Griliches, 1992). Second,
private investors can tap into information that subsidized companies are authorized in the sense
of promising technology. This can be rephrased as an information gap between rms and investors
(Myers & Majluf, 1984).
The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program that was started in 1982 in the United
States has played an important role in subsidization providing two billion dollars for U.S. companies
every year. The program requires (currently) eleven federal agencies to set aside (also currently)
2.9 percent of their extramural R&D funds for the program. The program consists of three phases
and only winners can proceed to the next phase. The program is one of the largest innovation
programs in the U.S. (Wessner, 2008). Japan started its own SBIR program in 1999 inspired by
that in the U.S.
The cost-eectiveness of all policies should be monitored but this is dicult to do for the
most of them because the eect spreads into society, making the problem more complex. Even
so, Lerner studied rms that won awards of U.S. SBIR program and demonstrated that the rms
grew signicantly faster in comparison with other matched rms and attracted venture nancing
(Lerner, 1999). Although Japan's SBIR program was studied by Eshima (Eshima, 2003), his study
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was limited compared to the coverage of analyses done by Lerner and his analyses had bias that
led readers to a dierent conclusion from one in this paper. The details on the problems will be
explained later.
We analyzed Japan's SBIR program by introducing data obtained from rms. The analyses
followed those of Lerner. More concretely, we assessed the growth of rms which won awards of
the SBIR program from 2006 to 2010. The analyses were done by comparing of matching rms
that were chosen to closely resemble the awardees. Growth was measured by sales, employees, and
the number of patents. The analyses also included patent data to examine characteristics specic
to R&D. The analyses had two clear limitations. The rst one was that they did not include social
welfare, which was the eventual goal of the policies. This means we only found the primary eect
of the subsidies. The second limitation was that they could not provide alternative policies because
we only studied one policy.
This paper is organized as follows. A brief explanation of the SBIR program is given in Section
2. Section 3 explains how we constructed the data we used in the analyses. Section 4 discusses
empirical analyses and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 SBIR programs
2.1 U.S. SBIR program
The United States' Congress enacted the SBIR Development Act in 1982 and established the SBIR
program, which mandated that all federal agencies spend more than $100 million to set aside 0.2
percent of their funds for the program. Over the next six years, the funds that were set aside
grew to 1.25 percent. This act was reauthorized in 1992, as the Small Business Research and
Development Enhancement Act. At this time, the funds that were set aside were doubled to 2.5
3
percent (Wessner, 2008). Congress passed numerous extensions, the most recent of which extended
the act through 2017. Also, the current funds that were set aside were set to 2.9 percent. The
set-aside will increase each year.
Eleven federal agencies have been participating in the program and they have individual respon-
sibility for the program. Therefore, they have been subsidizing and conforming to the guidelines
set by the SBIR program.
A document published by the Small Business Administration (Oce of Investment and Inno-
vation, Small Business Administration, 2012) provides current practical information. Here, we
present a plain explanation of the process for the program.
The SBIR program has three phases.
 Phase I: This phase is aimed at checking the technical advantages, feasibility, commercial
potential, and the quality of awardee performance prior to support in Phase II. Phase I
awards normally do not exceed $150,000 total costs for six months.
 Phase II: The main objective of this phase is to continue and enhance the R&D eorts
initiated in Phase I. Only Phase I awardees are eligible for a Phase II award. Phase II
awards normally do not exceed $1,000,000 total costs during two years.
 Phase III: This phase, where appropriate, is for small businesses to pursue commercialization
objectives resulting from Phase II activities. The SBIR program does not fund Phase III.
Some federal agencies promote the introduction of private investments or provide awardees
with production contracts for products such as procurements of agencies.
Eligibility for the SBIR program is mainly assessed as follows.
1. Owned independently and at least 51% by U.S. citizens.
2. No more than 500 employees, including aliates.
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3. Organized for prot and located in the United States
The achievements of the SBIR program are worth admiring. The SBIR program assessment
done in 2008 (Wessner, 2008) found that it was mainly eective in three areas.
1. Stimulating technological innovation
2. Increasing private sector commercialization of innovations
3. Providing widely distributed support for innovation activities
2.2 Japan's SBIR program
Japan has been in a serious long-term recession since 1991. The Ministry of International Trade
and Industry enacted a law in 1999 to facilitate the creation of new businesses that included
Japan's SBIR program to break out of the recession and secure more employment opportunities.
Apparently, Japan had considered the SBIR program in the U.S. to be successful. Then, the
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry enacted an act in 2005 to facilitate new business activities
by small and medium-sized enterprises that retained the SBIR program in Japan.
Although the program in Japan was naturally quite similar to that in the U.S., there were three
considerable dierences.
1. Awards by most ministries and agencies do not have phase systems. Only approximately 5%
of awards have phase systems that began in 2007.
2. Ministries and agencies mainly support awardees from nances in their own budget. How-
ever, the U.S. program helps awardees to access private investments and procurements by
governments.
3. The budget is much smaller. The ratio is from one fth to a half that of the U.S.
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Note that Japan has other initiatives for nurturing small high-technology businesses. For ex-
ample, the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization has a number of
their own initiatives other than the SBIR program. This paper only discusses the SBIR program
and its eects but naturally does not cover all initiatives for small high-technology businesses.
3 Data
Since we followed Lerner's analyses, we constructed data almost identical to his and added ad-
ditional data for further discussion. As primary data, we acquired published data from SBIR
awardees obtained from the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency. Table 1 summarized the num-
ber of constructed data. The data included 3,559 SBIR awardees from 1998 to 2010. However,
since many rms won more than one award, there were 1,640 rms. There were 507 awardees from
2004 to 2006. Even individuals can win awards in Japan unlike the SBIR program in the U.S.
We omitted individuals since they were not appropriate to the analyses in this paper. Finally, 301
rms were chosen as awardees from 2004 to 2006 to analyze their growth. Basically, Japan's SBIR
program does not have phase systems, and as phase II started from 2007 with only 5%, we ignored
it as was mentioned earlier.
We then constructed matching sets to compare means and percentiles and conducted regression
analyses. We selected rms that closely resembled awardees from Teikoku Data Bank (TDB) data,
which has one of the most comprehensive data on rms in Japan.
One set was matched on industry and rm size. The TDB data included its own industry
code. The middle classication has 91 dierent codes and we used this to categorize rms. Three
hundred one rms in the same classication with the closest sales in 2006 were selected from the
TDB data to pair them with 301 awardees.
Another set was matched on geographic location and rm size. The procedure was similar to
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that for the industry matching set. We used the two digits at the head of the zip code. The two
digits approximately correspond to prefectures. In the same way, three hundred one rms having
the closest sales in 2006 with the same zip code were selected.
The data construction in Lerner's work also included the investigations into acquiring invest-
ments by venture capitals. In line with it, we introduced data of investments by venture capitals
to areas in Japan (Venture Enterprise Center, 2010).
Thus far, we followed the protocol of the data creation conducted by Lerner. In addition, we
added supplemental data using the Institute of Intellectual Property data (Goto & Motohashi,
2007) for further analyses. We could add the number of registered patents in each year by rms.
The sample data are summarized in Table 2. The matching rms resembled the awardees
closely in sales. The employments of matching rms were higher than those of the awardees. This
is because the denition of a small rm is a rm with less than 300 employees in manufacturing or
less in other industries. Since SBIR awardees are small rms, this limitation lowers the number of
employees. The matching rms are not limited in small rms. The number of registered patents
by the awardees were seemingly larger than that by the matching rms.
4 Empirical analyses
4.1 Overall eect of subsidies
This section shows the overall comparison of growth for the awardees and the matching rms.
Table 3 lists the results. Panel A shows the change in sales from 2006 to 2011. The t-test and the
Mann-Whitney test are used to compare the two groups. If we consider 5% signicance level, the
tests indicate no signicance. 5% signicance level will also be used in other analyses.
Panel B shows the change in employment. Although the t-test in panel B does not indicate
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signicance, the Mann-Whitney test indicated signicance and it seems that employment of the
awardees is better.
If we think of the direct eect of awards, especially their direct commercial eect, the results
in panel A mean the SBIR program is disappointing. Although employment is somewhat better
for the awardees, better employment with not better sales makes us doubt overall growth.
The overall results in panels A and B are dierent from the SBIR program studied by Lerner.
The overall results for the SBIR program in the U.S. were signicantly positive.
Panel C has the change in the numbers of patents between from 2004 to 2006 and from 2007
to 2009. According to the t-test and the Mann-Whitney test, we cannot see the advantage of
the awardees. If the awardees demonstrated more possibilities of growth in terms of seeds of
commercialization, the awardees should have shown better performance. Although, intellectual
property cannot be considered to be direct growth, it is doubtful that rms, especially small rms,
can grow without intellectual property.
Comparing societies in two dierent countries is dicult at any time. Furthermore, there is a
convincing cause for comparing the results in Japan and the U.S. Lerner repeatedly emphasized
functions of private investments, which are almost equal to venture capital. He delved into the
details on what eect the private investments had and found that the success of awardees was
dependent on their ability to attract venture capital (Lerner, 1999).
Venture capital under management in the U.S. was worth 267 billion dollars in 2012 (Thomson
Reuters, 2013). However, that in Japan was worth approximately one billion dollars (one hundred
billion yen) in 2012 (Venture Enterprise Center, 2013). (We assume one U.S. dollar is equal to 100
Japanese yen.) The relative size of Japanese venture capital is 0.0037. This means that the relative
size of venture capital for each Japanese SBIR awardees is substantially small. In this situation,
small rms mainly rely on loan from banks or public agencies. This situation is far from the goal
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of the SBIR program and can be likened to a rocket without a fuel tank. Furthermore, as we saw
in panel C of Table 3, Japanese SBIR program has a problem to produce intellectual property.
It should be noted here that commercialization assistance, which is the most important part
of the program, seemed to have a problem in Japan. The SBIR program in the U.S. methodically
supports the commercialization of seeds grown by the program (Wessner, 2008). The support
includes a committee made up of researchers at universities, national institutes, or those who were
nance professionals. In comparison, we could not nd any similar support available in Japan as
is the case in the U.S. Although it is reasonable to assume that commercialization is the most
dicult part of R&D, it seems that Japan has not properly budgeted for commercialization.
It should also be noted that this paper focuses on the direct eects of subsidies, and not their
social benets. Even if we had focused on the direct eects, we still have diculty in estimating
them. First, since people in charge of ministries and agencies may want to show how successful the
SBIR program is, they may tend to choose their own favorite rms. This situation may inhibit fair
competition. Second, similar to the rst perspective, technological tasks presented by ministries
and agencies may only be overcome by some specic rms that are more familiar with the tasks
than others. Finally, subsidies themselves may not help skyrocket R&D in small high-tech rms.
This is because the small rms are organized by one key scientist or engineer and other members to
help him/her. This means that subsidies cannot help to scale the project up even if they hire more
members to help the key person. The most probable scenario here is that awardees just substitute
awards for their own budget for R&D and prolong the time for R&D. Bearing in mind the purpose
of the SBIR program, this is a crucial concern.
As we mentioned in Section 1, Eshima carried out the same overall analyses in Japan (Eshima,
2003) and said that SBIR awardees yielded positive results. His work is important as the rst
attempt toward the SBIR program analyses in Japan but the analyses seem to have the three
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problems. First, he made matching sets in a dierent way from that by Lerner, nevertheless he
could. Since he started from Lerner's work, as we did, avoiding comparisons of results without
any explanation seems to be unfair. Second, he mentioned he used phase II awardees' data, the
same as Lerner had done, but until 2007, the SBIR program in Japan did not have a phase system.
Finally, there was no regression analysis that Lerner had done. Regression analysis is important
to see what eect the SBIR program has by controlling other variables. Therefore, our paper can
provide fuller analyses and comparisons.
4.2 Eect of subsidies controlled by rms' attributes
We discussed previously the overall eect of the SBIR program. We next delve into more precise
analyses by introducing regression analyses. Table 4 lists the variables used in the regression
analyses. Most of them have been used in the previous analyses.
Table 5 examined the change in sales as well as the percentage change in sales. The inde-
pendent variables were sales in 2006, volume of venture capital investments in areas, a dummy
variable whether the rm received SBIR award, and an interaction between the volume of venture
capital investments and a dummy variable of SBIR award. This examination was conducted in
Ordinary Least Squares regressions. The results said SBIR award and the interaction term were
not signicant. This means that we could not nd neither solitary eect of SBIR award for growth
nor joint eect of SBIR award for venture capitals. In Lerner's work, however, the interaction term
was signicant. This means SBIR award in the U.S. has worked with venture capital nancing.
The result of Table 5 negated the eectiveness of the SBIR program in Japan. However,
we can expect that the SBIR program in Japan works in some limited condition. Therefore,
we divided the data according to two industrial types. Those types are high and low technology
industries. This is because high technology industries generally have more potential to grow largely
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than low technology industries. We employed the division of industries proposed by Okamuro
(Okamuro, 2006). Table 6 examined the industrial dierence of the change in employment. (We
used employment instead of sales to follow Lerner's work.) The independent variables are the
same as Table 5 but sales in 2006 was replaced with employment in 2006. We could not nd
signicance of SBIR award and the interaction term in low technologies. However, we found that
the interaction term showed signicance in high technologies, though volume of venture capital and
SBIR award are negatively signicant. On the other hand, Lerner also showed that the interaction
term was signicant in high technology industry. In addition, the dummy variable of SBIR award
in high technology industries was signicant. It can be said that U.S. SBIR awards strongly aects
high technology industries.
Next, we examined the eect of multiple awards using the awardees as well as those in high
technology industry. We can understand whether more awards promote growth of awardees through
this examination. That is, if it is true, volume of nancing is important. If it is false, SBIR award
works as a certication to attract nancing. Table 7 lists the results. As was mentioned earlier,
the data consist of the awardees and those in high technologies. The dependent variables are the
change in sales and the percentage change in sales. The independent variables are the sales in
2006, volume of venture capital investments in areas, a dummy variable whether the rm received
multiple SBIR awards, and an interaction term between the venture capital and the multiple SBIR
awards variables. The result says that neither multiple SBIR awards nor its interaction term is
signicant. We saw high-tech SBIR awardees have the positive and signicant interaction term in
the previous examination. Therefore, the signicance disappeared in this examination. We can
say SBIR awards have a certication eect to attract nancing from the examinations.
Finally, we examined the change and the percentage change in the number of patents registered.
The number of patents are certainly a reliable proxy of innovative activities. Therefore, if the
11
awardees have right ability to invent new products, we expect that the number of patents applied
by them increase. In other words, we see whether the Japanese ministries and agencies chose proper
SBIR awardees or not. Table 8 lists the results. We examined two datasets. One is the entire data
and the other is the rms of high technology industries. The dependent variables are the change
and the percentage change in the number of patents. The independent variables are prior patents,
which means patents during period from 2004 to 2006, volume of venture capital investments in
areas, a dummy variable whether the rm received any SBIR award, and an interaction term
between the venture capital and the SBIR awards variables. We could not see the dummy variable
of SBIR and the interaction terms are signicant in the models. Therefore, we can say the awardees
did not register more patents than non-awardees. It should be noted that we saw the interaction
term was signicant for high technology industries in the examination of employment (Table 6). If
the SBIR program properly aect awardees, we expect not only the growth in sales or employment,
but the growth in intellectual property. The results, however, negated it. It has to be said impact
of the SBIR program in Japan is suspicious.
5 Conclusion
We examined the direct eects of the SBIR program in Japan through rms' attributes. First, we
compared changes in sales, employment, and the number of patents between SBIR awardees and
matching rms. The SBIR awardees did not perform better in sales, employment, and patents.
Therefore, it seems that the overall eects of the SBIR program are not positive. Next, we examined
the SBIR program by using regression models. Although Japan's SBIR program is benecial for
rms in high technology industries and in areas with large venture capital investments, the negative
results were sustained.
In closing, we need to suggest some ideas to improve the program. First, it is important to
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rigorously assess the program. Although most countries have recognized that small businesses are
the key to economic growth, and where Japan is no exception, its ministries and agencies have
not assessed the program. We have to say they are not sincere. Even when budgets are not fully
available, it is easy to \set aside" some of the budget to assess the program. Second, appropriate
exits for awardees should be clear. We could not nd any publication that showed ministries and
agencies had strategies to create new markets after successful R&D projects were completed by
awardees. Therefore, the program has just been prolonging the life of small rms. Since these
ideas are not new but written on the document of the U.S. of assessment (Wessner, 2008), they
can be carried out.
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Table 1: Construction of sample of SBIR awardees and matching rms: The table lists the number
of samples we constructed. Basic data is 301 SBIR awardees. For each awardee, we chose a rm
that was industry-matched and closest in sales and a rm that was location-matched and closest
in sales. TDB in the table means Teikoku Data Bank data, which includes data on Japanese rms.
Firms No. of rms
SBIR awardees that received one or more awards
in 1998-2010 (including individuals) 1,640
in 2004-2006 (including individuals) 507
in 2004-2006 having valid data in TDB (rms) 301
Matching rms selected from TDB paired with SBIR awardees
Industry-matched and closest sales 301
Location-matched and closest sales 301
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Table 2: Comparison of SBIR awardees and matching rms: Sample data are compared to check
validity of matching rms. Unit for sales is in millions of yen. Matching rms were selected
according to 2006 sales and industries, or 2006 sales and locations.
Mean SD Minimum Maximum
SBIR awardees:
2006 sales 2,446 4,510 0.72 31,567
2006 employment 82 129.7 2 1,003
Patents during period from 2004 to 2006 4.9 12.8 0 182
Matching rms:
2006 sales 2,444 4,503 0.90 31,818
2006 employment 1,155 26,533.6 1 650,000
Patents during period from 2004 to 2006 1.1 6.2 0 85
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Table 3: Growth of SBIR awardees and matching rms: Changes in sales and the number of
patents indicate no signicant dierences between SBIR awardees and matching rms. Unit for
sales is in millions of yen. Dierences in changes in employment are signicant with median. Since
data do not seem to have a normal distribution, the signicance is more reliable than that with
mean. Three hundred one observations were made for SBIR awardees and 602 for matching rms.
SBIR Matching p-value of
awardees rms comparison
A. Change in sales, 2006-2011:
Mean -197.41 -100.98
75th percentile 92.05 62.54
Median -27.77 -29.89
25th percentile -270.35 -253.20
SE 113.78 10.95
p-value of t test 0.54
p-value of Mann-Whitney test 0.63
B. Change in employment, 2006-2011:
Mean -2.1 -1,094
75th percentile 9.0 4.0
Median 0 0
25th percentile -4.0 -4.0
SE 2.2 1,090.5
p-value of t test 0.31
p-value of Mann-Whitney test 0.01
C. Change in patents, between 2004-2006 and 2007-2009:
Mean -4.5 -7.6
75th percentile 0.0 0.0
Median -3.0 -2.0
25th percentile -6.0 -5.0
SE 0.90 3.84
p-value of t test 0.42
p-value of Mann-Whitney test 0.72
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Table 5: OLS regressions, with change and percentage change in sales as the dependent variables
Dependent variable:
Change in sales % Change in sales
(1) (2)
2006 Sales  0.076  0.004
(0.017) (0.005)
Value of venture capital  0.0001 0.001
(0.009) (0.003)
Any SBIR award 1.742 1.338
(3.293) (1.089)
Value of venture capital * Any SBIR award  0.016  0.003
(0.015) (0.005)
Constant 1.267 0.877
(2.001) (0.662)
Observations 892 892
R2 0.026 0.003
Adjusted R2 0.022  0.001
Residual Std. Error 22.371 7.399
F Statistic 5.940 0.723
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
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Table 6: OLS regressions for rms in industries with high and low technologies with change in
employment as the dependent variables
Dependent variable:
Change in employment
High-tech Low-tech
(1) (2)
2006 employment  0.243  0.198
(0.031) (0.046)
Value of venture capital  0.178  0.020
(0.066) (0.073)
Any SBIR award  39.672  4.195
(22.821) (23.831)
Value of venture capital * Any SBIR award 0.233 0.069
(0.107) (0.121)
Constant 51.143 12.719
(15.975) (15.565)
Observations 103 47
R2 0.416 0.323
Adjusted R2 0.392 0.259
Residual Std. Error 53.290 35.363
F Statistic 17.443 5.014
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
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